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OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE  
TO LATIN AMERICA



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THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES  
OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE  
TO LATIN AMERICA,

by

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John S/Fitch

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## FOREWORD

This paper was presented at the Military Policy Symposium sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute, held at the US Army War College in early 1977. Under the general theme "Inter-American Security and the United States," a broad range of issues affecting US relations in the Latin American region were addressed. This paper argues that US aid and assistance policies have significant political consequences in Latin America.

The Military Issues Research Memoranda program of the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, provides a forum for the timely dissemination of analytical papers such as those presented at the 1977 Military Policy Symposium.

This memorandum is being published as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. The data and opinions presented are those of the author and in no way imply the endorsement of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

*DeWitt C. Smith Jr.*

DeWITT C. SMITH, JR.  
Major General, USA  
Commandant  
1 June 1977



### **BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR**

**DR. JOHN SAMUEL FITCH** is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado in Boulder. He received master's degrees in international relations and in political science from Yale University, completing his doctorate at Yale in 1973. From 1971 to 1977, he was a member of the faculty of the Department of Political Science and the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Florida, specializing in the study of the military in politics in Latin America and Africa.

## **THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA**

After a long and controversial career,<sup>1</sup> the US Military Assistance Program (MAP) is being phased out under heavy congressional pressure. Congress has, since the mid-sixties, placed a growing number of restrictions on US military aid, but the "International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976" now virtually eliminates several key elements of the traditional aid program. While largely unnoticed outside the halls of Congress and the Pentagon, this event merits a great deal more attention than it has in fact received, especially given the key role which military assistance has had in postwar US foreign policy. Overall, more than 200,000 foreign military officers and a somewhat larger number of soldiers have received US military training under MAP auspices. Total MAP expenditures since World War II have been estimated at more than \$90 billion. Even though Latin America has been only one small part of the overall program, MAP expenditures for this region alone exceed \$2.5 billion. Moreover, Latin America accounts for a relatively high proportion of the US trainees, with over 70,000 Latin American officers and men receiving some form of MAP training since 1950.<sup>2</sup> It would therefore

seem to be an appropriate time to analyze the political consequences of our military aid program to Latin America. While additional data and the passage of time would permit a more definitive analysis, there is also a need for timely input into the ongoing debate within the executive branch over whether to accept the new congressional restrictions and, if not, how to continue these activities under different guises. On both sides, however, the argument hinges largely on conflicting claims about MAP's intended and unintended political consequences.

In the eyes of most Marxist scholars, there is little doubt about the nature or consequences of US training of Latin American military personnel, whether this training takes place in US schools or locally in courses given by US military advisors or mobile training teams. The intent of the program is both to increase counterinsurgency capabilities and to strengthen counterrevolutionary attitudes among both officers and men.<sup>3</sup> In particular, the goal is to

- (1) develop a propensity to solicit and/or acquiesce in American policy suggestions; (2) structure a definition of national interest which precludes nonalignment; and (3) inculcate an ideology of development which stresses subsidies and hospitality to transnational corporations.<sup>4</sup>

According to this view, US arms transfers to Latin America under the grant and credit sales portion of the assistance program function primarily as means through which to purchase influence with local military officers and to secure entry for US military advisors.<sup>5</sup>

Most radical scholars also argue that MAP has been fairly successful in achieving these objectives.

The relationships structured by MAP training not only aid conservative officers in suppressing radical conspiracies but the process of ideological indoctrination progressively denudes radical factions of potential sympathizers with the military establishments.<sup>6</sup>

As a result, the actual number of radical military coups has diminished,<sup>7</sup> despite the often-cited counterexample of Peru.

The counterinsurgency program trains and arms the Latin American armies, increasing their superiority over the average citizen in any situation of physical conflict [and] provides an ideological frame which justifies and encourages military intervention in situations which would normally be under civilian control.<sup>8</sup>

Thus in the Marxist view, US military assistance programs are a crucial

link in the web of power relationships through which the United States maintains its hegemony over the dependent and underdeveloped nations of Latin America.

A fairly large number of American liberals, including many congressmen, have come to share the view that MAP has been a significant factor in the increasing number of Latin American military coups and military governments. Edwin Lieuwen, a frequent critic of MAP in congressional hearings, has argued that counterinsurgency equipment and training are most often used against the military's civilian political opponents, thereby reinforcing the power of the armed forces which have generally opposed progressive social and economic reforms.<sup>9</sup>

Nevertheless, the empirical evidence which has been presented in support of such claims is not especially impressive. Apart from anecdotal evidence from particular cases—General Vernon Walters having breakfast with General Castello Branco on the morning of the 1964 coup in Brazil—much of the evidence consists of data on the magnitude of the program and of statements in congressional hearings by different congressmen and representatives of the Department of State and the Department of Defense. Depending on the conclusions one wishes to support, the size and scope of MAP activities can be made to appear overwhelmingly important or relatively modest.<sup>10</sup> For example, “the US aid program has accounted for 50 percent of what the larger countries spend on arms acquisition and up to 90 percent of what many of the smaller countries spend.”<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, less than 800 Latin American officers have received advanced (command and general staff) training at military schools in the United States since 1946, an average of 40 per country or less than 2 officers per country per year.<sup>12</sup> Quite frequently, crucial parts of the empirical data are simply not available or not reported. We do not even know exactly what proportion of Latin American officers have received US training, much less what proportions in different ranks in different countries have received each of the various types of US training. However, even if the percentages were high, it would not prove that the program has actually achieved the effects claimed for it.<sup>13</sup> Citing testimony by State Department officials and generals trying to justify MAP expenditures to a suspicious Congress is a clever but not very persuasive tactic, given the obviously self-serving nature of much of the testimony and the limited empirical evidence offered to support these claims by either supporters or opponents of the program.<sup>14</sup>

Attempts by non-Marxist scholars to use empirical data to scientifically test these hypotheses have consistently produced negative results. In perhaps the most widely cited study of this type, Charles Wolf compared scholarly ratings of the "democraticness" of those Latin American countries receiving high levels of US military aid with the scores of those receiving low levels of US assistance.<sup>15</sup> Both total MAP expenditures and per capita MAP expenditures show only weak rank order correlations with the average Fitzgibbon democracy scores for the years 1950, 1955, and 1960. Moreover, the correlation, although weak, was positive, indicating that those countries receiving more aid were slightly more democratic, instead of more prone to military coups and dictatorships.<sup>16</sup> In addition, those countries receiving high levels of military assistance were no more likely to go down in their democratic ratings from 1950 to 1960 than were those countries receiving less.<sup>17</sup> More recently, Philippe Schmitter has also reported insignificant correlations between total and per capita US military aid and measures of military rule.<sup>18</sup> Despite the substantial increases in the magnitude of MAP expenditures in Latin America beginning in 1961 and the simultaneous shift in MAP focus from external defense to counterinsurgency, the results are basically the same for the 1945-61 and the 1962-70 periods.<sup>19</sup>

These studies have contributed to the widespread belief that US military missions, arms sales, and training of Latin American officers have little or no systematic impact on the behavior of the Latin American military. Both Schmitter and Wolf conclude that military rule in Latin America cannot be attributed to American "military aid or defense programs. Indeed these factors do not appear to play a significant role in the process at all."<sup>20</sup> These findings have in turn been widely accepted by other scholars. Thus Samuel Huntington writes in his classic work on Third World politics that

No convincing evidence exists of a correlation between American military aid and military intervention in politics. Military aid and military training are by themselves politically sterile; they neither encourage nor reduce the tendencies of officers to play political roles.<sup>21</sup>

A senior fellow of the Brookings Institution, after a detailed review of the military assistance training program, concludes with the same flat assertion:

United States training has little effect one way or the other on the political role of the armed forces, a role deeply rooted in the history and culture of

a country. MAP training has had no significant effect on the character or frequency of military intervention.<sup>22</sup>

These conclusions by eminent social scientists have in turn been eagerly seized upon by defenders of the military assistance program.<sup>23</sup>

In fact, these conclusions have little or no claim to the mantle of "scientific truth" with which they have been imbued. By generally accepted methodological canons, the statistical studies on which these conclusions are based are subject to a variety of serious criticisms. In the first place, the standard statistical model used in these studies is inappropriate to the hypotheses under consideration. That model assumes, for example, that a country which has a \$4 million assistance program should have proportionately more military intervention in politics than a country with a \$2 million program. Nothing in the logic or actual statement of the anti-MAP argument suggests that the political effects should be proportionate to the number of dollars expended or that the relationship is linear, continuous, or unidirectional.<sup>24</sup> Secondly, these studies assume that the political impacts of MAP are invariant with respect to context. If, for example, MAP programs lead to military role expansion in politically weak states, but less military interest in politics where there are strong civilian institutions, the methods used in these studies will lead to the false conclusion that military aid has no political impact. Thirdly, most of these studies utilize only a static, cross-sectional analysis to test a hypothesis which refers to the political consequences *over time* of the military assistance program.<sup>25</sup> On these grounds alone, the findings of these statistical analyses could be seriously impugned.

Nevertheless, the most serious deficiency of these studies is that they are simply not appropriate to the arguments allegedly being tested. The radical critique of MAP is not that it is responsible for all military intervention in politics, but that it has a conservative, counterrevolutionary impact on the attitudes of Latin American officers which in turn influences the ideological orientation of their intervention, the type of government likely to be overthrown, and the kinds of policies likely to be followed by military regimes. The radical argument does not necessarily imply that military intervention becomes more frequent as a result of US military aid and training. Indeed, if the government in power were pursuing rigorous antirevolutionary policies, MAP could conceivably reduce the frequency of intervention by facilitating the formation of a conservative civilian-military consensus. Therefore, a weak or insignificant correlation between MAP

expenditures and measures of the extent or frequency of military intervention in politics cannot be considered a disproof of the Marxist critique.<sup>26</sup>

A more appropriate test of that argument would be a direct demonstration of the impact of MAP activities on the attitudes of Latin American military officers. Unfortunately interview data on Latin American military elites are extremely difficult to obtain. While the evidence currently available is fragmentary at best, the preliminary indications are that US training does not have the strong "indoctrination effect" implied in Marxist hypotheses.

First, with regard to the impact of US training on attitudes toward the government in times of political crisis, the evidence is somewhat contradictory. Writing on the African military, Robert Price has argued that British and French training of African officers establishes a strong psychological identification with the military of the "mother country."

Table 1

**American Military Training and Attitudes  
Toward the 1963 Coup in Ecuador**

	Attended American Military Schools	No Experience in US Schools
<b>Attitudes Toward Coup</b>		
Neutral or Pro-Government	4 (20%)	2 (15%)
Favor	7 (35%)	4 (31%)
Strongly favor	9 (45%)	7 (54%)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>20 (100%)</b>	<b>13(100%)</b>
<b>Stress on Communist Issue as Factor in Personal Decision</b>		
No mention	4 (21%)	1 (8%)
Mentioned	9 (47%)	8 (62%)
Most stressed	6 (32%)	4 (31%)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>19(100%)</b>	<b>13(101%)*</b>

Source: John Samuel Fitch, *The Military Coup d'Etat as a Political Process: Ecuador, 1948-1966*, Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming, p. 252.

\*Figures may not equal 100% because of rounding.

External elites then become the crucial "reference group" shaping the attitudes of local officers.<sup>27</sup> If this argument applies to Latin America, one would expect US trained officers to behave differently in coups involving governments antagonistic to US policies and/or economic interests. In the Brazilian coup of 1964, Alfred Stepan did in fact discover a disproportionate number of US trained officers among the generals who conspired against Goulart and formed the nucleus of the Castello Branco government.<sup>28</sup> Nevertheless, US training was only one of a complex of characteristics—experience in Italy with the Brazilian Expeditionary Force during World War II, close associations with the Brazilian Superior War College, and military family backgrounds—that characterized this particular group of officers.<sup>29</sup> The other case for which some data are available is the 1963 Ecuadorian coup against Carlos Julio Arosemena who was widely denounced by US military personnel in Ecuador as an anti-American Castro sympathizer. In this case, however, US trained officers were not more likely to have favored the anti-Arosemena coup and indeed put slightly less stress on the "communist threat" issue than those officers trained elsewhere.<sup>30</sup> These figures could, however, also be misleading as they do not take into account the fact that many of the officers who never left Ecuador were nevertheless exposed to American training through other means, in particular through US course materials, advisors, and/or instructors in various military schools in Ecuador. Still, perhaps because so few Latin American officers received their basic military socialization in the United States, there do not appear to be the strong reference-group identifications with the United States that Price observed among Ghanaian officers trained at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst.

A second potential effect of US training is on the individual officer's beliefs about the proper role of the military in politics. While MAP supporters have frequently argued that US training would inculcate American doctrines of civilian supremacy,<sup>31</sup> its critics have argued that MAP has been a major vehicle for the diffusion of US counterinsurgency doctrines which imply a sharply expanded military role in political and socioeconomic questions.<sup>32</sup> Here again, the evidence available is limited to only two countries. Among Ecuadorian officers, those who attended US command and general staff schools were slightly more likely to favor an "arbiter" role than those trained in Chile or in Ecuador itself, although the differences are not great. (These results are again somewhat marred by the influence of both American and Chilean advisors to the Ecuadorian War Academy.) Nevertheless,

Table 2

## Foreign Training and Formal Role Definition in Ecuador

Formal Role Definition	GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL ATTENDED					Spain, Italy, Brazil, Argentina
	Ecuador	Chile	U.S.	Subtotal		
Constitutionalist	12 (44%)	5 (56%)	3 (27%)	20 (43%)		2 (15%)
Arbiter	9 (33%)	3 (33%)	5 (45%)	17 (36%)		7 (54%)
Developmentalist	6 (22%)	1 (11%)	3 (27%)	10 (21%)		4 (31%)
TOTAL	27 (99%)*	9 (100%)	11 (99%)*	47 (100%)		13 (100%)

  

	ATTENDED SUPERIOR WAR COLLEGE	
	No	Yes
Constitutionalist	24 (40%)	1 (14%)
Arbiter	27 (45%)	1 (14%)
Developmentalist	9 (15%)	5 (71%)
TOTAL	60 (100%)	7 (99%)*

Source: Fitch, *The Military Coup d'Etat*, p. 296.

\* Figures may not equal 100% because of rounding.

US training seems to have had much less impact in stimulating adoption of more interventionist doctrines than training in other Latin American countries, especially Argentina and Brazil. Apparently the enormous socioeconomic and political differences between Ecuador and the United States reduced the transfer of doctrines that were, however, perceived as readily applicable to Ecuador when they were encountered in Argentina or Brazil. Still, by far the strongest impact on role definitions occurred among those officers who had attended a superior war college course. Only one of these received his training in the United States; the remaining ESG graduates attended these courses in either Brazil or Argentina.

**Table 3**  
**US Training and Formal Role Definitions:**  
**Peruvian Army and Navy Officers 1976**

	Received US Training			
	No (% in Sample)	Yes (% in Sample)		
Professionalist	2 (40%)	2	(22%)	
Constitutionalist	0 ( 0%)	1	(11%)	
Arbiter	2 (40%)	1	(11%)	
Developmentalist	1 (20%)	5	(56%)	
TOTAL	5 (100%)	9	(100%)	

Source: William Robert Salisbury, *Special Career Experiences and Role Definitions Among Peruvian Officers*, M.A. thesis, University of Florida, 1977, p. 69.

In a smaller, also nonrandom sample of Peruvian officers interviewed in 1976, US training appears to be moderately associated with belief in more interventionist role definitions, particularly with the doctrine of "national security and development." However, of the several career characteristics found to be correlated with Peruvian role definitions, US training appears to have less impact than participation in civic action programs or branch of service.<sup>33</sup> In general, the evidence available seems to indicate that role definitions are primarily determined by a given officer's perceptions of the capacity of the civilian leadership to effectively manage the problems facing the country as compared with the military's capacity to resolve those problems.<sup>34</sup> This balance of

perceived capability to govern may be influenced by US training, particularly if the training involves skills which heighten military self-confidence, but generally these capability perceptions reflect the on-going experience of success and failure of civilian and military governments. Thus role definitions tend to change over time, even where MAP relationships have remained fairly constant.

A third type of attitudinal impact of MAP activities is in establishing an image of the "modern military" for the Latin American officer to emulate. While no direct evidence is available, this would appear to be one of the most pervasive effects of American training and advisory activities. Alternative military models clearly exist, most notably in the low technology, relatively self-sufficient "people's army" of Communist China. These models appear to be virtually unknown in Latin America, where America's near-monopoly on military assistance activities results in a strong tendency to equate modernity with capital-intensive, high technology weapons. So, regardless of their political differences, the Peruvian and Brazilian militaries seem to have very similar tastes in equipment, with both preferring a squadron of Mirage jets over several squadrons of propeller-driven Mustangs.<sup>35</sup> (In fact, both would probably have preferred US 5-SE's to the Mirages. The general preference of many Latin American officers for US weapons systems has also been linked to MAP training and advisors.<sup>36</sup>) Another indication of the same process can be found in the frustration expressed by one Ecuadorian officer that Ecuador could not afford the kind of sophisticated logistics system he had learned to administer in his US course. In establishing the US military as the model to be emulated, MAP contributes to military demands for American-style equipment, administrative systems, PX's, pension plans, and salaries. MAP therefore seems to lead to increased budgetary demands by the armed forces and to heightened frustrations where economic constraints prevent satisfaction of these demands. Thus, whereas the statistical studies cited earlier found no correlation between military aid and military rule, Schmitter did find a positive correlation between MAP expenditures and domestic military spending. After examining spending patterns cross-sectionally and over time, he concludes that

U.S. military grants, credit-assisted sales, and surplus sales generally have the net *marginal* effect of raising national defense expenditures *above* the level anticipated by the total size or relative level [of development] of a nation's economy.<sup>37</sup>

Still the economic costs of adopting the American military model may

be less significant than the political costs of emulating force structures and manpower policies which make little or no contribution to the creation and diffusion of a sense of political legitimacy or national identity.<sup>38</sup>

This brief review of the empirical data on the attitudinal effects of MAP on Latin American officers suggests the following hypotheses:

- Most Latin American officers entering US training programs already exhibit the kinds of political attitudes generally alleged to be the product of US indoctrination.
- US training does increase the intensity and strength of these attitudes.
- The magnitude and permanence of these attitudinal shifts varies according to the duration of the US training experience.
- The magnitude and permanence of these shifts also vary by the type and level of training given.
- Training in the United States produces greater shifts than a comparable course given in the Canal Zone which in turn produces greater shifts than the same course given in the host country. The shifts produced by training in the United States are, however, generally smaller than those produced by the same course taken in one of the more modern Latin American countries.
- Perceptions of the attributes characterizing "modern military forces" are strongly influenced by US training.
- Role definitions are relatively unaffected by US training except for minor shifts produced by senior level courses which stimulate short-term increases in military self-esteem and self-confidence.<sup>39</sup>

Nevertheless, at this point these can only be considered hypotheses. It should also be pointed out again that none of the studies cited above have really tested the basic Marxist argument that US training is a mechanism for the dissemination of an anti-Communist ideology which is hostile to nonalignment, sympathetic to US foreign policy goals, and favorably disposed to collaboration with US multinational corporations. Given that there are in fact several *alternative* explanations for the strongly anti-Communist attitudes of most Latin American military officers,<sup>40</sup> there is really only one research design capable of isolating the effect of US training. Testing these competing hypotheses would require that a sample of Latin American officers be interviewed before and after receiving US training. Shifts in attitudes toward communism, threat perceptions, images of the United States, strategies for development, etc., would then have to be compared to the

shifts occurring in a comparable group of officers not receiving US training.<sup>41</sup> A complete study would also involve a re-interview after perhaps a year to see if the training-induced attitude shifts were sustained after re-entry into the local context. Until this kind of research has been done, it cannot be said that MAP supporters have really disproved the arguments of the critics who consider it a counterdemocratic influence as well as a counterrevolutionary force in Latin American politics.

Nevertheless, the arguments thus far examined concern only the impact of MAP on the attitudes of Latin American military personnel. On an entirely different level, there is a growing body of evidence that US military assistance programs do have an important impact on the level of professionalization of Latin America's armed forces. It is important to be clear that professionalization, as used here, refers to the level of technical development and complexity of the military career as a profession. Professionalization is therefore a characteristic of the armed forces as an institution, not a function of the attitudes of officers toward their political roles. Thus a simple operational measure of professionalization might be the number of months of full-time schooling that senior officers have completed in the span of their careers. While direct evidence of a causal relationship is again unavailable, by their very nature MAP activities constitute a transfer of organizational and military technology between the United States and Latin America which increases the professionalization of Latin American armed forces.

This transfer of technology is most apparent in the activities of US military advisory groups.<sup>42</sup> Ostensibly the function of the military missions is to assist the host institution with any problem for which they desire assistance. In practice, the primary concerns of US advisors have been to improve the quality of military education and to improve the organization of the local forces. In Ecuador, when the War Academy was reopened in 1956, American advisors were largely responsible for drawing up the curriculum and for providing the initial corps of instructors. At approximately the same time, American advisors helped to design and execute a major reorganization of the general staff to incorporate new departments specializing in logistics, mobilization, and intelligence. These departments were to be staffed by graduates of the revised War Academy curriculum. A lesser example of the same concern for education and organization was reported by a retired US Navy captain who had served as the Chief of the Naval

Mission to Ecuador in the early 1950's. After discovering that the Ecuadorian Navy had virtually no system of personnel records, he set up the first real system of personnel administration and later organized the first Navy school for machinists and other technically trained noncommissioned personnel. A detailed study of the activities of military advisors in Latin America would probably show that, in terms of man-hours, perhaps 70 to 80 percent of their time is devoted to improving the educational level and organizational structure of the host military institution.

Direct US training of Latin American military personnel again serves to increase the technological sophistication and organizational capabilities of Latin American militaries. In Ecuador alone, over 1600 officers and men have received training in the United States or the Canal Zone.<sup>43</sup> Given some rough guesses about the proportion of officers in these courses and in total military personnel, it would appear that the proportion of Latin American officers who have received US training is relatively high. Assuming a complete turnover of the estimated 115,000 officers in the region occurs every 20 years, around 38 percent have received some form of US training.<sup>44</sup> (Based again on a very small number of cases, these percentages appear to vary considerably from country to country. Over 60 percent of a sample of senior Ecuadorian officers in 1963 had received some US training abroad as compared with 25 percent of the Brazilian generals on active duty at the time of the anti-Goulart coup in 1964.<sup>45</sup>) While the bulk of this training consists of technically oriented, relatively short courses for junior officers and NCO's, for those officers selected to attend an advanced course like the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, this training not only prepares them to hold key posts in a complex general staff structure; it also qualifies them to teach the same curriculum at the local Leavenworth-equivalent or to organize a general staff if one does not already exist. After all, what good does it do to have learned modern staff procedures if no opportunity exists to use these new skills? According to the well-known principle of the methodological hammer—a child given a hammer will find something to beat on; a graduate student trained in computerized statistical analysis will find data to correlate and regress upon—training Latin American officers in modern military, managerial, and analytical skills makes it very likely that local military institutions will be modified to create opportunities to use those skills.<sup>46</sup>

The third type of US military assistance is the provision of military

equipment through direct grants, subsidized loans, or commercial sales. Regardless of whether we are giving away World War II tanks and destroyers or selling modern supersonic fighters, any new weapons system invariably has its organizational component. The existing military structure will have to be modified to accommodate the new equipment. Mach II jets will sooner or later "require" the corresponding radar network and a unified air defense command system. Each new weapon will also generate a need for personnel with sufficient technological skills to use and maintain the new equipment. While the initial contract for a new weapon usually provides for US training or instructors and some period of US maintenance, most often the result is ultimately the creation of a new school or training program, in short, an enhanced capability to produce a higher level of technological skills. Although the United States has faced increasingly stiff European competition in arms sales, during the past decade the United States was still the largest single source of military equipment in the area.<sup>47</sup>

In general, then, US military assistance programs increase the level of technical competence of the recipient forces, improve the quantity and quality of specialized training for local officers, encourage the creation of "modern, rational-legal" bureaucratic structures, and help provide the managerial skills needed to run these structures. In short, the impact of MAP is to increase the level of professionalization of Latin American military forces. Not surprisingly, those countries which now have the most highly professionalized militaries in Latin America are precisely those which over the past 25 years have received the largest amounts of MAP funds. For the three most highly professionalized militaries, cumulative MAP expenditures since 1946 average \$275 million. Among the moderately professionalized, the average is \$108 million and, among the less professionalized, \$30 million.<sup>48</sup> While military professionalization also correlates well with the size and level of economic development of the country, there are several interesting exceptions to this pattern. Mexico in particular appears to be less professionalized than one would expect on the basis of size and level of development. Perhaps this is a result of Mexico's relatively unique pattern of civil-military relations; perhaps it reflects Mexico's extremely low levels of participation in MAP activities. Peru, on the other hand, is more professionalized than one would expect for a country at that level of development. At the same time, Peru is the only one of the highly professionalized militaries to have received proportionately high levels of US military assistance, especially US training.

Nevertheless, high cumulative MAP expenditures are probably both a cause and a result of high military professionalization. Variations in MAP expenditures also reflect variations in the capacity to absorb transfers of organizational technology and military expertise from the United States. The ability of an Ecuadorian officer to put into practice the skills acquired through MAP is limited by the manpower, technical development, and budget of the Ecuadorian armed forces. Where Ecuador cannot really afford an American-style logistics system, the Brazilian and Argentine armies can and in fact have emulated the American system. Inasmuch as a modern American-style military requires large amounts of capital and skilled manpower, high levels of military professionalization are more likely in those countries which can afford a large military budget. Military budgets are in turn correlated with total Gross Domestic Product and the overall level of socioeconomic modernization. In the smaller, poorer countries like Ecuador, Nicaragua, or the Dominican Republic, one generally finds more political influence in promotions and assignments, less extensive and less specialized military training systems, and fewer specialized military journals. On the other hand, in the most highly modernized countries one finds a military rank structure very similar to that of the US military, largely meritocratic criteria for promotion, highly sophisticated military technology, and extensive systems of military education.<sup>49</sup> This pattern is clearly self-reinforcing as the rate of diffusion of professional innovations is again closely correlated with the level of professionalization. Superior war colleges to train future generals were first established in Brazil, Peru, and Argentina in the early 1950's. The Ecuadorian equivalent did not open until 1973 and many of the smaller countries of Central America and the Caribbean still do not offer this level of advanced training.

If, on the one hand, the capacity to absorb new technology is highest among the more professionalized militaries, the military assistance program is comparatively more important to the smaller countries. Controlling for the size of their military forces, the ratio of US trainees in the most highly professionalized militaries averages around 66 per thousand, compared with 111 per thousand in the moderately professionalized countries, and 279 per thousand in the low professionalization countries. Among the least professionalized military forces, the proportion of US trainees is over four times as high as it is in the most highly professionalized forces.<sup>50</sup> The same applies to training at the US Army School of the Americas (USARSA) at Fort Gulick,

Table 4  
The Distribution of US Military Assistance To Latin America

Country	Military Forces (TMF) 1970	Professionalization*	USARSA		Total MAP Funds 1946-75
			US Trainees TMF 1946-75	Trainees TMF 1946-76	
Brazil	225,000	High	38/1000	2/1000	\$480 million
Argentina	144,000	High	26	4	\$191
Mexico	71,000	Moderate	10	4	\$ 12
Chile	64,000	Moderate	99	33	\$168
Colombia	55,000	Moderate	113	41	\$141
Peru	50,000	High	135	49	\$153
Venezuela	31,000	Moderate	172	97	\$146
Dominican R.	19,000	Low	195	55	\$ 32
Bolivia	17,000	Low	233	180	\$ 51
Ecuador	17,000	Low	268	145	\$ 47
Uruguay	16,000	Moderate	159	51	\$ 71
Paraguay	13,000	Low	110	70	\$ 18
Guatemala	9,000	Low	337	170	\$ 35
El Salvador	6,000	Low	280	174	\$ 14
Honduras	5,000	Low	528	406	\$ 16

\*Based on the number of regularly published military journals and 1970 expenditure per soldier.

Sources: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures 1971*, Washington, DC; Bureau of Economic Affairs, 1971, pp. 11-13, 19, 35; North American Congress of Latin Americanists, "U.S. Training Programs for Foreign Military Personnel: The Pentagon's Protégés," *Latin America and Empire Report*, Vol. 10, No. 1, January, 1976, 24-28; US Army School of the Americas, *Course Catalogue 1976*, Fort Gulick, Canal Zone: USARSA, 1976, p. vi; and John Samuel Fitch, *The Military Coup d'Etat*, p. 89.

which appears to serve largely as a source of advanced and technical training for those armies too small to individually support such a high degree of specialization. Brazil and Argentina, with nearly half of the region's military forces, together account for less than 3 percent of the USARSA graduates since 1946. The average proportion of USARSA graduates increases from 18 per thousand among the highly professionalized militaries to 45 per thousand in the middle group to 172 per thousand among the less professionalized. In fact, these figures underestimate the US impact on the smaller countries. In Ecuador, in addition to those officers with US training, a large number had received training in other Latin American countries, especially Brazil and Chile. The higher levels of military professionalization in these countries was in part itself a product of large-scale US assistance programs in the past. The transfer of US technology to the smaller countries is therefore really a two-step process.

Total foreign military sales per soldier follow the reverse pattern, averaging \$1038 per member in the most professionalized group, compared to \$402 per member for the least professionalized. Presumably the difference reflects both superior economic capacity and the ability to utilize technologically complex and therefore expensive weapons systems. Grants of surplus US equipment are, however, again skewed in favor of the smaller, poorer countries. The most advanced militaries averaged only \$90 per member in excess US equipment. The corresponding figures for the moderate and low levels of professionalization were \$146 and \$214 respectively. Thus, while MAP has no doubt played an important role in the high level of professionalization achieved by Argentina, Brazil, and especially Peru, its most important impact has probably been to enable countries like Ecuador, Guatemala,<sup>51</sup> and Honduras to achieve a level of professionalization higher than their own budgetary and technological resources would have permitted. While the level of institutional development and technical sophistication achieved by these forces is still modest by Latin American standards, on a broader international scale these would have to be ranked in an intermediate position, low but still considerably above most of the militaries of sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>52</sup>

What then are the political consequences of this higher level of military professionalization? The evidence from a wide range of carefully conducted case studies on the military in Ecuador,<sup>53</sup> Brazil,<sup>54</sup> Peru,<sup>55</sup> Colombia,<sup>56</sup> and Guatemala<sup>57</sup> clearly indicates that,

given the political and socioeconomic conditions which prevail in Latin America, increased military professionalization leads to increased political activity by the armed forces.<sup>58</sup> The impact of higher professionalization on military self-confidence and hence its association with a tendency to adopt more interventionist role definitions has already been noted.<sup>59</sup> The more important consequence of increased professionalization is to strengthen the psychological bonds between the individual officer and the military as an institution. The extensive training programs required for a professionalized military organization involve prolonged exposure to an institutional socialization process that emphasizes the distinctive values, ideals, and symbols of the armed forces. The 8 to 10 years of military training given to senior officers in Brazil (as opposed to 1 to 3 years in most African militaries) is in effect a prolonged indoctrination in the belief that military officers are distinct from—indeed in most ways superior to—the rest of society.<sup>60</sup> Extended military training thus has the effect of changing the degree of psychological identification with the armed forces.<sup>61</sup> Conversely it diminishes the relative importance of the officer's identification with the class, region, or tribe from which he came. In general, the higher the level of professionalization, the stronger the corporate military identity of the officers and the weaker the pull of their social origins.

This corporate identification plays a crucial role in shaping the military's behavior in times of political crisis. Even in the relatively less professionalized militaries, this institutional identification underlies most of the criteria by which military officers decide whether to support or overthrow a particular government.<sup>62</sup> The military's concern for such factors as the level of public disorders, public opinion toward the government, government attention to their institutional interests, and even the threat of communism is based in the perception that these factors relate to the well-being of the military as an institution, an institution in which the officer has a heavy psychological investment.<sup>63</sup> In effect, given a moderately professionalized military, the survival of the government comes to depend on its ability to provide an environment that does not threaten the welfare and security of the armed forces.<sup>64</sup>

In addition, the achievement of higher levels of professionalization is generally accompanied by a tendency to assert greater autonomy from the civilian leadership in political questions. While the Ecuadorian military, for example, has never been uninvolved in political questions, up until the 1950's professional military men played a distinctly

secondary role in most political conflicts, usually as the pawns of various competing civilian factions. The armed forces as a whole were subject to high levels of political manipulation by the president who used the army in particular as an instrument to maintain himself in power. Following the reorganization and military reforms of the 1950's—reforms sparked by Ecuador's defeat in the 1941 war with Peru, but made possible in large measure by the US military assistance program—the Ecuadorian military began to act more as a collective military institution. The isolated barracks revolt almost disappeared. In its place came a fairly routinized process of intramilitary consultation in times of crisis.<sup>65</sup> Increasingly the military began to resist civilian authority in military questions, culminating in the 1971 revolt in which the army overthrew the Minister of Defense and for the first time imposed its own man as the Army Commanding General. The decision to support or overthrow the government was now basically a military decision, to be made according to the military's own criteria for evaluating its political environment. When the political scene shifted from the banana boom of the fifties to the economic stagnation and populist politics of the sixties, the result was three military coups in the space of 6 years. In Ecuador, the higher levels of professionalization achieved since World War II have been a major factor in the institutionalization of the coup d'etat as an integral part of the Ecuadorian political process.

Again relying heavily on the Ecuadorian example,<sup>66</sup> it can be argued that the institutionalization of the coup d'etat has serious negative consequences for the long-term development of Latin American societies. Based on the experience of a number of countries, it appears that developing nations caught in the "praetorian syndrome" are unlikely to escape the high level of instability and military intervention which characterize politically underdeveloped societies, *unless* they are able to create a new basis of legitimacy through some clear and visible change in the socioeconomic status of the mass of the population and some form of meaningful mass participation in the political process.<sup>67</sup> If these are in fact the prerequisites for political development, in those countries where the military has achieved some degree of professionalization, the institutionalization of the coup d'etat makes it unlikely that these prerequisites will be achieved.

First of all, once a strong institutional identification and a primary loyalty to the armed forces have been established, a set of coup decision criteria is adopted through which the military, in effect,

protects itself against the institutional costs of maintaining an unpopular government through a period of political crisis. Not only is there the obvious military reaction against radical governments or leftist political movements which are usually perceived as threats to the institution. These decision criteria also generally lead to intervention whenever sufficient public opposition emerges against a government which has become too harshly dictatorial or repressive, too socially retrograde, or simply too inept. Whatever its origins, if the crisis becomes sufficiently severe, if the government loses its public support, the result is generally a coup d'état which removes the offending administration, restores public calm, and installs a new government, usually with the blessing and applause of those antagonized by the government just deposed. If a new crisis emerges, as it must periodically given the high dependence of Latin American economies on volatile external markets, the result is generally a new coup, installing a new government with a mandate to avoid the mistakes of its predecessors.

Gradually the participant citizenry may become disillusioned with civilian rule. At the same time, the inability of civilian leaders to provide a politically secure environment for the military usually leads to a simultaneous shift toward arbiter and developmentalist role definitions, doctrines which legitimate military intervention to restructure that political environment. However, given the predominantly antipolitical, bureaucratic mentality of most military officers, military governments are highly unlikely to favor mass mobilization or radical redistribution. Hence military governments almost invariably suffer the same lack of legitimacy as their civilian counterparts and most will sooner or later be overthrown in a new coup d'état.

Over the long run, if we could measure the trends in public support for and opposition to the government, we would find an erratic but persistent cycle of gradually eroding support and rising opposition, periodically cut short and restarted by coups or new elections. Governments come and go. Military governments may alternate with civilian governments and periods of high instability will be interspersed with periods of "normalcy" as the state of the economy varies. Over time, cynicism and apathy may grow, but rarely to the point of endangering the system. Thus the institutionalization of the coup d'état as part of the political process may be profoundly inimical to true social and political development, in the sense that underlying a high degree of surface instability are mechanisms for the release and

limitation of the discontents generated by socioeconomic structures which are nevertheless ultrastable, since these mechanisms prevent the accumulation over time of these discontents and their transformation into revolutionary convictions of the illegitimacy of the *status quo*.

Succession, programmatic reform, and palace revolutions function as substitutes for political and social revolutions... Less fundamental changes have the (proximate) consequence of reducing the intensity of predispositions to more fundamental ones... Opposition perspectives in the mass are not ordinarily directed toward the adoption of fully specified policies but... are in considerable degree simply demands for a change.<sup>68</sup>

The military coup d'etat satisfies those demands without changing the structures generating the discontent. As a mechanism which releases and limits socioeconomic discontents, the institutionalized coup d'etat exerts a profoundly conservative influence on the development of Latin American societies.

Thus Ecuador, for example, has changed relatively little in the past 25 years, despite a modest but steady trend toward modernization, a doubling in the rate of political participation, and 9 governments in the last 16 years. After a quarter of a century, the basic social structure remains intact and the economy is still wedded to externally controlled markets for primary products. The political system still lacks both legitimacy and political institutions that could mobilize mass support on a sustained basis. Like other Latin American countries, Ecuador tends to change very little, despite a high rate of surface political instability.<sup>69</sup> As indicated above, the institutionalized coup d'etat plays a crucial role in this process. The institutionalization of the coup is, however, itself largely consequence of the increased professionalization of the armed forces to which the US military assistance program has made a substantial contribution.

Thus, whatever the effects of US MAP activities on the political attitudes of Latin American officers, there are other effects, particularly on the professionalization of Latin American military forces, whose political consequences may be far more important than the direct ideological effect implied by most Marxist critics of the military assistance program. This is not to suggest that there would be no military intervention in Latin America if MAP were terminated or if it had never existed. Nevertheless, the absurdity of that claim must not be used as evidence for the counterproposition that US military assistance activities have had no discernible political impact. Given the evidence available, that claim would appear to be equally ridiculous.

At the same time, it should be acknowledged that the negative political consequences described above are in no way peculiar to American military assistance. The institutional impacts of international transfers of military technology are largely the same, regardless of whether the donor is the United States, the United Kingdom, France, or Israel.<sup>70</sup> The loss of the temporary American monopoly over arms transfers to Latin America has not altered the impact of high technology weapons on military professionalization. The political consequences of a squadron of Mirages do not appear to be demonstrably different from those of a squadron of F-5E's. Thus the phasing-down of US MAP activities will not have any dramatic political repercussions. For the most part, the US role will be taken over by our NATO allies and by Brazil, Argentina, and Peru. In part because of their long involvement in MAP as recipients of US military technology, the latter have become sufficiently professionalized to act as purveyors of professionalization to their less sophisticated Latin American neighbors. In particular, Brazil can be expected to become a major supplier of training, arms, and perhaps advisors for countries like Uruguay, Ecuador, and Bolivia.

Finally, if the reduction in US MAP activities is accompanied by an increased Soviet role as a supplier of arms and military training as in Cuba and more recently Peru, it may be possible to assess the relative importance of the ideological versus the institutional consequences of external military assistance. By the arguments presented here, the impact of Russian training on the political behavior of Peruvian officers is likely to be marginal at best, given the heavily technical nature of the training and the Peruvians' strong ideological predispositions in other directions. On the other hand, in Cuba, given favorable ideological predispositions, these arguments would predict that Russian aid will reinforce these attitudes and at the same time lead to increased military professionalization, greater military autonomy, and very probably a higher level of civil-military tensions.<sup>71</sup> Nevertheless, a great deal more research is needed on *both* the attitudinal and institutional effects of foreign military assistance before the issue of their relative importance can be seriously joined.

## ENDNOTES

1. Although the US military had been involved in similar activities prior to the Cold War, this paper is primarily concerned with programs undertaken pursuant to the Military Security Act of 1951. A brief history of MAP activities in Latin America is given in Harold Hovey, *United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965, pp. 49-53. On the changes in MAP after the Cuban revolution, see Willard Barber and C. Neale Ronning, *Internal Security and Military Power: Counterinsurgency and Civic Action in Latin America*, Athens, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1966. See also Stephen S. Kaplan, "U.S. Arms Transfers to Latin America 1945-1974: Rational Strategy, Bureaucratic Politics, and Executive Parameters," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. XIX, No. 4, December, 1976, pp. 399-431.
2. Expenditure figures refer to 1946-75; training figures cover 1950-75. Both are taken from US government data published by North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), "U.S. Training Programs for Foreign Military Personnel: The Pentagon's Proteges," *Latin America and Empire Report*, Vol. 10, No. 1, January, 1976, pp. 24-31.
3. John Saxe-Fernandez, "The Central American Defense Council and Pax Americana," *Latin American Radicalism*, ed. by Irving Louis Horowitz, Josue de Castro, and John Gerassi, New York: Random House, 1969, pp. 82, 84, 89, 94-95. See also NACLA, pp. 7, 11-12.
4. Miles Wolpin, *Military Aid and Counterrevolution in the Third World*, Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1972, p. 11.
5. Saxe-Fernandez, p. 81.
6. Miles Wolpin, "External Political Socialization as a Source of Conservative Military Behavior in the Third World," *Militarism in Developing Countries*, ed. by Kenneth Fidel, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1975, p. 266. See also NACLA, p. 10.
7. Wolpin, *Military Aid*, p. 152.
8. Saxe-Fernandez, p. 89.
9. Edwin Lieuwen, "Neo-Militarism in Latin America: The Kennedy Administration's Inadequate Response," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Vol. 16, Spring, 1963, pp. 13-16. For a representative sampling of liberal opinion, see the testimony of Ralph Dungan, George C. Lodge, David Bronheim, and Ben Stephansky in "United States Military Policies and Programs in Latin America," *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations*, US Senate, 91st Congress, First Session, June 24 and July 8, 1969, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1969, pp. 1-55.
10. Among the non-Marxist MAP critics, John D. Powell also relies heavily on this kind of argument. "Military Assistance and Militarism in Latin America," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 18, June 1965; pp. 384-86.
11. Michael Klare, *War Without End: America's Planning for the Next Vietnams*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972, pp. 281-2.
12. Calculated from data on foreign graduates of US command and general staff courses from 1946 to 1970 in Ernest Lefever, "The Military Assistance Training Program," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social*

*Science*, Vol. 424, March 1976, p. 88. Overall senior officers constitute only a relatively small proportion (6.4 percent) of all US trainees here and abroad between 1964 and 1969. Calculated from DOD data in Wolpin, *Military Aid*, p. 99.

13. In terms of training and, to a lesser extent, total expenditures, the largest military aid programs have been in Southeast Asia, in particular in Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam. These countries can hardly be considered evidence of MAP's effectiveness.

14. On the pro-MAP side, Hovey, pp. 66-72, uses much the same method of "proof" to arrive at the opposite conclusion.

15. Charles Wolf, "The Political Effects of Military Programs: Some Indications from Latin America," *Orbis*, Vol. 8, Winter, 1969, pp. 877-82.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 882-83.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 884-85. In a partial replication of the Wolf study, Thomas Brown has come up with somewhat different results. Using per capita MAP expenditures, he finds that those countries receiving greater than median amounts of MAP funds were more likely to decline in their Fitzgibbon scores from 1950 to 1965, although the differences are again too small to be statistically significant. Looking at the aggregate and individual case data, Brown concludes that the "statistics tend to mildly support the notion that military aid programs are not generally conducive to political progress, although there is some evidence that they may help progress in countries which have a low level of political development." Thomas A. Brown, "Statistical Indications of the Effect of Military Programs on Latin America," Rand Memorandum P-4144, Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1969, p. 9. These results suggest a curvilinear relationship in which the effect of US aid will vary depending upon the country. This result is consistent with the arguments developed in this paper, but the Brown study is subject to all the same methodological criticisms which, in my view, invalidate the Wolf and Schmitter studies.

18. Philippe Schmitter, "Foreign Military Assistance, National Military Spending, and Military Rule in Latin America 1945-61, 1962-70," *Military Rule in Latin America: Function, Consequences, and Perspectives*, ed. by Philippe Schmitter, Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1973, pp. 130-47.

19. In another quasi-empirical article, John M. Baines cites Defense Department figures showing that there were slightly more coups from 1930 to 1949, prior to the advent of large-scale MAP activities, than there were from 1950 to 1969. He also presents DOD data on the number of coups in countries with large MAP expenditures compared to countries receiving little or no MAP funds. With no information provided on the total size of each group of countries, the comparison is meaningless. Nevertheless, he concludes that "it has been demonstrated that military assistance has not been a direct cause of anti-democratic military coups or of militarism in general in Latin America." John Baines, "US Military Assistance to Latin America: An Assessment," *Journal of Interamerican and World Affairs*, Vol. 14, November 1972, pp. 476-78, 485.

20. Wolf, p. 890; Schmitter, p. 148.

21. Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, p. 193.

22. Lefever, p. 90. He goes on to assert that "MAP training makes no attempt to mold the political philosophy of the student, much less tamper with his political loyalty." *Ibid.*, p. 91. In the light of the abundant data available on the

ideological content of MAP curricula, this statement is patently ridiculous. See Wolpin, *Military Aid*, pp. 47-64, and NACLA, pp. 10-19.

23. See Charles Meyer, "US Military Activities in Latin America," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Vol. 23, Autumn 1969, p. 92; and testimony by Assistant Secretary of State Gordon quoted in "Why Military Assistance is Given to the Argentine Dictatorship," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Vol. 21, Autumn, 1967, pp. 84-85. MAP advocates are seemingly not perturbed by the apparent contradiction in their claims that MAP is politically sterile, but nevertheless an effective and worthwhile program that "has provided a valuable channel of communications and influence with a significant elite, many of the latter being in positions of political responsibility." Lefever, p. 85.

24. On the assumptions of the regression model used in the Schmitter study, see Hubert Blalock, *Social Statistics*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960, pp. 236-58. The cross-tabulation analysis used by Wolf is less demanding, but involves many of the same assumptions. See Edward Tufte, "Improving Data Analysis in Political Science," *World Politics*, Vol. 21, July, 1969, pp. 641-54; and Hubert Blalock, *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964, pp. 30-35, 119-24.

25. The only longitudinal tests are by Wolf, pp. 884-85, and Brown, pp. 4-9, using changes in the Fitzgibbon democracy index over a 10 and 15 year period respectively. The analysis is still cross-sectional, however, in that military aid is not measured in absolute amounts or relative to past aid, but rather by comparison to the median amount of aid received by all Latin American countries. The Fitzgibbon index is also highly suspect as an empirical measure of MAP's political effects.

26. See Wolpin, *Military Aid*, p. 152-53. Wolpin attempts to prove the Marxist argument with data on the ideological orientation of a nonrandom sample of coups in Africa and Asia. With the exception of the misspecification of the test, all the same methodological criticisms enumerated above also apply to this attempt to use numbers to support the radical hypothesis.

27. Robert Price, "A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States: Reference Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case," *World Politics*, Vol. 13, April 1971, pp. 399-430.

28. Alfred C. Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971, p. 247.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 236-48. Given the high intercorrelations and small sample, there is unfortunately no way to isolate the impact of US training.

30. John Samuel Fitch, *The Military Coup d'Etat as a Political Process: Ecuador 1948-1966*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming, p. 252.

31. See, for example, Lefever, p. 90.

32. See NACLA, pp. 5-6; Wolpin, *Military Aid*, pp. 121-56; Klare, pp. 29-55, 270-310.

33. William R. Salisbury, *Special Career Experiences and Role Definitions Among Peruvian Officers*, MA thesis, University of Florida, 1977, p. 108-115. Most of the Peruvian officers interviewed denied that their US training had influenced their beliefs. Again most argued that the vast differences in the two societies made the American model irrelevant.

34. Fitch, pp. 276-307.

35. Geoffrey Kemp, "The Prospects for Arms Control in Latin America: The Strategic Dimensions," *Military Rule in Latin America: Function, Consequences, and Perspectives*, ed. by Philippe Schmitter, Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1973, p. 227; Luigi Einaudi et al., *Arms Transfers to Latin America: Toward a Policy of Mutual Respect*, Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1973, R-1173-DOS, pp. 2-4.

36. Geoffrey Kemp, *Some Relationships Between U.S. Military Training in Latin America and Weapons Acquisition Patterns 1959-1964*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Arms Control Project, Center for International Studies, MIT, 1970.

37. Schmitter, pp. 135-36.

38. See Fitch, pp. 84-85.

39. Testing the argument that US training and advisory programs create personal bonds which facilitate the transmission of attitudinal cues from US officers to local personnel would require a different kind of study.

40. Fitch, pp. 222-32.

41. See Donald Campbell and Julian Stanley, *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research*, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963.

42. Unlike the military attaches, MAAG's (usually one for each service) do not operate out of the US Embassy, but are normally attached to the Defense Ministry or General Staff, putting the advisors in close, often daily contact with senior officers of the host country. As of 1970, the Army advisory group in Ecuador occupied one entire wing of the second floor of the Ministry of Defense. Even though Ecuador is one of the smallest and strategically least significant countries in Latin America, the Army mission consisted of a colonel, several majors, and a variety of support personnel.

43. NACLA, p. 28. The same source lists 2,955 Ecuadorians "trained abroad," presumably at US courses given in Ecuador.

44. These estimates assume that officers constitute roughly 15 percent of the total military forces in Latin America and furthermore that officers constituted half of the 71,000 US trainees from 1950-75. Sources: NACLA, p. 28; Lefever, p. 86; and United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures 1970*, Washington, DC: Bureau of Economic Affairs, ACDA, 1970, p. 27.

45. Stepan, p. 247, and unpublished data on the interview sample described in Fitch, pp. 177-78.

46. See Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*, Berkeley, California: Institute of International Studies, 1973, pp. 79-89, for a highly sophisticated appraisal of the frustrations and political tensions arising from a lack of opportunities to exercise one's technical skills.

47. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1966-1975*, Washington: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1976, p. 80. See also NACLA, "Arms, Technology, and Dependency: U.S. Military Co-Production Abroad," *Latin America and Empire Report*, Vol. 11, No. 1, January 1977, pp. 25-32.

48. Figures calculated from Table 4 below.

49. Stepan, pp. 48-54.

50. This pattern has also been noted by Klare, pp. 280-81.

51. On Guatemala, see Caesar Sereseres, "The Guatemalan Armed Forces: Military Development and National Politics," paper presented to the sixth annual meeting, Latin American Studies Association, Atlanta, Georgia, March 25-27, 1976, pp. 32-34.
52. Comparative data on levels of military professionalization in Latin America are presented in Fitch, p. 89.
53. *Ibid.*, pp. 330-33.
54. Stepan, pp. 172-87.
55. Luigi Einaudi and Alfred Stepan, *Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil*, Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1971, pp. 1-57, 123-24.
56. Richard Maullin, *Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia*, Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1973, pp. 111-18.
57. Sereseres, p. 25-53.
58. On the special case of high modernization and high military professionalization, see O'Donnell, pp. 154-65.
59. See also Abraham Lowenthal, "Armies and Politics in Latin America," *World Politics*, Vol. 27, No. 1, October 1974, pp. 129-30.
60. For an example of the kinds of themes emphasized in the military socialization process in Ecuador, see Fitch, pp. 79-80.
61. Stepan, pp. 48-56; Sereseres, p. 46.
62. Fitch, p. 261-74; Stepan, pp. 153-71.
63. On the institutional rather than ideological basis of military anticommunism, see Stepan, p. 156-58; Fitch pp. 253-57; and Martin Needler, *Anatomy of a Coup d'Etat: Ecuador 1963*, Washington, DC: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1964, p. 41.
64. Sereseres, p. 39.
65. Cf. Einaudi and Stepan, pp. 43-44.
66. This section of the paper is drawn directly from Fitch, pp. 341-55.
67. Raymond Hopkins, "Equality, Structure, and Legitimation: Alternative Political Paths in Kenya and Tanzania," paper presented to the American Political Science Association, Washington, September 1972; Ergun Ozbudun, "Established Revolution Versus Unfinished Revolution: Contrasting Patterns of Democratization in Mexico and Turkey," *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society*, ed. by Samuel Huntington and Clement Moore, New York: Basic Books, 1970, pp. 380-405; Egil Fossum, "Political Development and Strategies for Change," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1970, pp. 17-32; Huntington, pp. 264-343; Richard Fagen, *The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969, pp. 148-65.
68. Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950, pp. 276-77.
69. Charles Anderson, *Politics and Economic Change in Latin America*, Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1967, pp. 87-114; Merle Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and Instability in Latin America," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 1, March 1956, pp. 20-23; Kalman Silvert, *The Conflict Society*, New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1961, p. 20.
70. On the operation of foreign military missions prior to the advent of large-scale US MAP activities, see Frederick M. Nunn, "Effects of European Military Training in Latin America: The Origins and Nature of Professional

Militarism in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru, 1890-1940," *Military Affairs*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, February, 1975, pp. 1-7.

71. Jorge I. Dominguez, "Institutionalization and Civil-Military Relations in Cuba," *Cuban Studies/Estudios Cubanos*, Vol. XI, No. 1, January, 1976, pp. 39-65.

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19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)  US military assistance; Latin America; political consequences; Latin American politics; Ecuadorian military; institutionalized coup d'etat; structural impediment to socioeconomic and political development.		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)  Training and advising programs constitute a mechanism for the transfer of organizational technology, and generally contribute to the increased professionalization of Latin American military institutions and increase the propensity for involvement in politics. ↙		

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